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MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL'S LABOR TURMOIL:
THE FAILURE OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION
JEFFREY S. MOORAD*
Professional Baseball is on the wane. Salaries must come
down or the interest of the public must be increased in
some way. If one or the other does not happen, bank-
ruptcy stares every team in the face.
Albert Spalding, Owner
Chicago White Stockings, 18811
You go through The Sporting News for the last one hundred
years, and you will find two things are always true. You
never have enough pitching, and nobody ever made
money.
Donald Fehr, Executive Director
Major League Baseball Players Association 2
Basically, the players just don't trust the owners. We don't
want to repeat the past.
Mike Greenwell, Left Fielder
Boston Red Sox 3
Since professional baseball began in 1869,4 labor relations be-
tween players and club owners have been highly contentious. More
* BA., UCLA, 1978; J.D., Villanova University School of Law, 1981. Mr.
Moorad is a partner in Steinberg & Moorad, a law firm specializing in the repre-
sentation of professional athletes and media figures. Mr. Moorad's practice in-
cludes the representation of over 20 Major League Baseball players, including Matt
Williams, Ivan Rodriguez, Will Clark, Eric Karros, Raul Mondesi, and Travis Lee.
The author wishes to thank Scott G. Parker (B.A., Stanford, 1985; J.D., Boalt Hall,
University of California at Berkeley, 1990) and Kevin Scott Dickey (B.A., University
of California at Berkeley, 1992; J.D., University of San Francisco School of Law,
1996) for their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Curtis Stock, The Money Game, EDMONTON J., Dec. 12, 1995, at Dl.
2. Christopher D. Cameron & Michael Echevarria, The Ploys of Summer: Anti-
trust, Industrial Distrust, and the Case Against a Salary Cap for Major League Baseball, 22
FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 827, 852 (1995).
3. A History of Baseball Disputes, USA TODAY, Mar. 19, 1990, at 8C.
4. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE
THE BIG BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 2 (1992). Baseball's origins have
been traced back as far as 1839. See Note, Baseball and the Law-Yesterday and Today,
32 VA. L. REv. 1164, 1165 (1946). However, players were not compensated for
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labor-management disputes have arisen in Major League Baseball
(MLB) than in any other major professional sport played in the
United States, particularly since the advent of collective bargaining
in the past three decades. 5
The tension that characterizes baseball's labor relations is the
product of almost a century of near-total owner hegemony over the
game and its players' careers through use of the infamous reserve
clause. Players ultimately overthrew the reserve system in the 1970s,
but only through a determined campaign involving litigation, arbi-
tration, and collective bargaining.6 This revolution led to a remark-
able period of salary gains and player freedom for almost two
decades.
Since the establishment of the current system in 1976, owners
have engaged in increasingly desperate efforts to turn back the
players' gains. In every set of collective bargaining discussions since
then, management has espoused plans or positions that would ab-
rogate some or all of the players' hard-fought rights to free agency,
salary arbitration and freedom from industry-wide salary controls.
For several years in the 1980s, owners illegally colluded to destroy
the open market for free agents, a policy that instilled a new gener-
ation of major league baseball players with distrust toward owners.
Finally, ownership's attempts to impose a salary cap in collec-
tive bargaining discussions during the 1994 season touched off the
1994-1995 players' strike, the longest strike in professional major
league sports history.7 The strike was also the only sports labor
their performance until 1869, when the Cincinnati Red Legs formed. See ZImALm-
iST, supra, at 2. Within two years, there were ten professional baseball teams, and
the first baseball league, the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, was
established in 1876. See Robert A. McCormick, Baseball's Third Strike: The Triumph
of Collective Bargaining in Professional Baseball 35 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1139 (1982).
5. See Gary Mihoces, Labor Strife Now Just Part of the Game, USA TODAY, Jan. 9,
1995, at 1C. Since 1969, professional major league sports played in the United
States (baseball, football, basketball and hockey) have experienced 14 labor-man-
agement disputes resulting in either lockouts or strikes. See id. One-half of these
disputes involved MILB. See id.
6. See ZIMBAdlST, supra note 4, at 20-21. The final blow to the reserve clause
came when, in December 1975, a grievance panel headed by Peter Seitz ruled that
'players were free to bargain with other clubs once their contracts expired." Id. at
21. The owners fired Seitz and appealed to the federal district court, where their
appeals were denied in March, 1976. See id.
7. See ChristopherJ. Fisher, The 1994-95 Baseball Strike: A Case Study in Myopic
Subconscious Macrocosmic Response to Conflict, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 367, 393
(1996). The strike, which began on August 12, 1994, lasted for 232 days. See id.
The second-longest strike in professional major league sports history occurred in
1982, when the NFL's regular season was interrupted for 57 days. See Mihoces,
supra note 5.
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stoppage to result in the termination of a season." Moreover, the
labor-management stand-off persisted through the 1996 season and
beyond.
This article will examine the history of MLB's labor relations,
with particular emphasis on the rise of the Players Association and
the long-standing mistrust between labor and management, the
three-tiered player compensation system that emerged from the
sport's collective bargaining discussions, and the owners' three-
year-old, and thus-far frustrated, attempts to overturn that system
through negotiation or fiat. The article will conclude with some
thoughts as to the future of baseball's labor relations, both as to the
probable settlement of the current dispute (unresolved as of this
writing) and to the lessons learned from the tumult of the last few
years.
I. THE HISTORY OF LABOR RELATIONS IN BASEBALL
To understand the current tenor of labor relations in baseball,
it is important to analyze its history. This history reveals patterns of
owner behavior that readily explain the atmosphere of mistrust and
animosity that pervades the sport to this day.
A. The Reserve Clause
Although the official position of baseball's first governing
body, the National Association of Baseball Players, was that paying
players for their services was "reprehensible and not in the best in-
terests of the game,"9 it was not uncommon for teams to pay tal-
ented players.10 Many players began to move from team to team
during the season, allowing for greater compensation, a practice
called "revolving.""
8. See Strike Chronology, USA TODAY, Dec. 16, 1994, at 5C; see also USA TODAY
BASEBALL WEEK.LY, 1995 ALMANAC, 36 (P. White ed., 1995) (including complete text
of owners' agreement terminating the 1994 season). Allan "Bud" Selig, the acting
commissioner of baseball and owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, announced the
termination of the season and the cancellation of the World Series on September
14, 1994, a little over a month after the strike began. See id. The World Series was
cancelled at only one other time, in 1904. See GLENN DICKEY, THE HISTORY OF THE
WORLD SERIES SINCE 1903 21 (1984). The 1904 game, which would have been the
second World Series, was cancelled after New York Giants owner John Brush re-
fused to participate, stating: "There is nothing in the constitution or the playing
rules of the National League which requires its victorious club to submit its cham-
pionship honors to a contest with a victorious club in a minor league." Id.
9. David Pietrusza, The Business of Baseball, in TOTAL BASEBALL 568, 597 (John
Thorn & Pete Palmer eds., 1995).
10. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 4, at 2.
11. See Pietrusza, supra note 9, at 588.
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Revolving continued as regular professional play began. 12 Tal-
ented players found that "contract jumping" created competition
for their services and thus increased their compensation.13 This
practice proved financially ruinous for the nascent National League
clubs, however, and as a result more than one-half of the League's
teams collapsed under the economic strain caused by competition
for players.' 4
The owners of the remaining National League clubs, deter-
mined to halt contract jumping, reached a secret "gentlemen's
agreement" under which each team could "reserve" five players.
Other teams agreed not to court players on the reserve lists. These
lists proved so successful in stifling increases in player salaries that
by the 1890s every professional baseball contract included a reserve
clause. ' 5
The reserve clause allowed a team to renew a player's contract
for one year unilaterally upon its expiration, even if the player re-
fused to re-sign with the team.' 6 Because the new contract would
also include a reserve clause, players found themselves in a contrac-
tual hall of mii-rors, with endlessly repeating obligations and no rea-
sonable way out.17 Players could not seek employment with other
teams; those that did, found themselves permanently barred from
the sport.' 8 Thus, players remained bound to their original team,
12. See id.
13. See id. William Hulbert, the National League President at the time, said of
increasing player salaries: "it is ridiculous to pay ballplayers $2,000 a year when the
$800 boys often do just as well." Id.
14. See McCormick, supra note 4, at 1140. Heavy bidding for talent resulted in
the failure of 8 of the original 15 teams by the end of the 1879 season. See id.
15. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 4, at 4.
16. See JOHN HELYAR, LORDS OF THE RxALM 35 (1994). The version of this
renewal clause that existed prior to 1976, as set forth in paragraph 10(a) of the
Uniform Player's Contract, read as follows:
On or before January 15 ... the Club may tender to the Player a contract
for the term of that year by mailing the same to the Player. If prior to the
March 1 next succeeding said January 15, the Player and the Club have
not agreed upon the terms of such contract, then on or before 10 days
after said March 1, the Club shall have the right.., to renew this contract
for the period of one year.
Id. The current paragraph 10(a) differs in a number of important respects, includ-
ing its references to free agency, the maximum salary reduction rule and player
rights. See BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AMERICAN LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL CLUBS AND THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS AND
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, Schedule A, para. 10(a) (Jan. 1,
1990) [hereinafter BASIc AGREEMENT OF 1990].
17. See Thomas J. Hopkins, Arbitration: A Major League Effect on Players' Salaries,
2 SETON HALLJ. SPORTS L. 301, 304 (1992).
18. See American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441,
449, 454 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914).
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absent retirement or the team's decision to trade or cut them. 19
These conditions led one judge to liken the practice to indentured
servitude and to write that "[t]he quasi peonage of baseball players
under the operations of this plan and agreement is contrary to the
spirit of American institutions, and is contrary to the spirit of the
Constitution of the United States." 20
The owners' purported rationale for the maintenance of the
reserve system was the necessity of maintaining healthy and robust
competition between teams, a dynamic referred to as "competitive
balance."21 Competitive balance was indeed an issue at times dur-
ing the early years of professional baseball.22 However, the reserve
system was hardly a panacea. At the same time owners were prohib-
iting players from choosing to switch teams on their own, they often
promoted competitive imbalance. Poor clubs would literally sell
the contracts of their talented players to richer teams.23 As has fre-
quently been the case, owner justifications for policies limiting
player freedom were often disingenuous at best.
B. The Antitrust Exemption
While it has been suggested that the players' initial reaction to
the reserve lists was positive, it soon became clear that reservation
was not in the players' best interest.24 Reservation brought an end
to the free market for their services, along with an end to their sal-
ary increases. There were two principal reactions to the reserve
clause and the control it provided to owners. First, players and
other individuals established alternative leagues which forced the
development of competition for players' services. Second, players'
associations were formed.
19. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 10.
20. Chase, 86 Misc. at 465.
21. See Hopkins, supra note 17, at 303-04.
22. See McCormick, supra note 4, at 1140 n.44. For instance, in 1869 the Cin-
cinnati Red Legs went undefeated for 57 consecutive games; in 1875, the Boston
Red Stockings won 71 of their 79 games. See id.
23. See ZIMRAIST, supra note 4, at 5; Hopkins, supra note 17, at 304. Of this
process, John Montgomery Ward, organizer of the first players' association, once
said that "[p]layers have been bought, sold and exchanged as though they were
sheep instead of American citizens." HELYAR, supra note 16, at 5.
24. See Pietrusza, supra note 9, at 588. When the reserve lists were small, play-
ers were said to have taken pride in their inclusion on the list. See id. This sugges-
tion seems dubious, as it is unlikely that many players were aware of the "secret
agreement" between owners prior to the wholesale adoption of the reserve clause
in the late 1880s. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 10.
1997]
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The first alternative league to the National League was the
American Association, which began play in 1882.25 The American
Association abolished the reserve clause, sold tickets for half the
price of those sold by National League clubs and allowed beer and
whiskey in the stands on Sundays.26 Unfortunately for the players,
the American Association entered into a pact with the National
League in 1883, under which it abandoned its policies in favor of
those of the National League. 27 Two additional leagues, the Union
Association and Players League, soon followed. 28 Although both
groups weakened the National League's hold on baseball, both
failed within one season. 29 The National League partially absorbed
all three leagues. 30
The only alternative league to gain a foothold during this pe-
riod was the American League, which emerged in 1892 as the West-
ern League. 31 By the turn of the century, the American League had
wooed 100 players from the National League, and was drawing
500,000 more fans per season.3 2 Once again, club owners found
competition not to their liking. In 1903, the two leagues came to
an agreement under which the National League accepted the
American League as an equal, and together the two leagues formed
the bicameral system that characterizes Major League Baseball
today.3 3
In 1913, the Federal League was established - the last alterna-
tive league of the pre-World War II era.34 Next to the American
League, the Federal League was the most successful of the alterna-
tive leagues, lasting for three major league seasons. 35 As part of the
dissolution agreement between National League and Federal
25. See GLENN DicKEY, TiE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LEAGUE BASEBALL SINCE
1901, 1 (1980).
26. See Pietrusza, supra note 9, at 588.
27. See id.
28. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 4, at 5. The Union Association was founded in
1884 by railroad tycoon Henry Lucas. See id. The Players League was founded by
baseball's first labor organization, the Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Play-
ers. See id.
29. See id. at 7-8.
30. See id.
31. See Dicv, supra note 25, at 3. Ban Johnson, the President of the Western
League, renamed it in 1899. See id.
32. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 4, at 7.
33. See id. at 7-8.
34. See id. at 8-9.
35. See id. The Federal League (FL) began as a minor league in the 1913
season. See id. However, an increasing number of major league players defected to
the FL through the 1915 season. See id. Finally, after disputes between MLB and
the FL over access to the player's market, the parties resolved their dispute in
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League owners, the National League absorbed some of the Federal
League's teams, while others were simply bought out.3 6
Among the teams to be bought out were the Baltimore Terra-
pins. However, the Terrapins' owners felt that the $50,000 offer
they received from the National League was unsatisfactorily low.3 7
The Terrapins rejected the offer and sued the National League for
violations of federal antitrust laws, claiming that the National
League had monopolistic control over the operation of major
league baseball. 38 The case, Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Na-
tional League of Professional Baseball Clubs,39 ended up before the
United States Supreme Court in 1922.40 The Court, in a unani-
mous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, held that
baseball was not subject to federal antitrust laws because it was not
an activity involving interstate commerce. 41 Justice Holmes, while
acknowledging that baseball clubs necessarily moved from state to
state to compete, wrote that "[t]he business is giving exhibitions of
base ball, which are purely state affairs .... That which in its con-
summation is not commerce does not become commerce among
the States because... transportation... takes place."42
The antitrust exemption established in Federal Baseball was of
extraordinary importance to the owners because it allowed them to
operate their businesses without interference from the outside.
Owners have jealously guarded the Federal Baseball decision from its
announcement, generally avoiding judicial scrutiny through out-of-
court settlements and lobbying Congress to ensure its continued
vitality. In the seventy-two years between Federal Baseball and the
1994 players' strike, baseball's antitrust exemption was never in seri-
ous jeopardy before Congress and has faced only slightly more ex-
acting scrutiny from the judiciary.
Perhaps the strongest assault upon the antitrust exemption oc-
curred immediately following World War II. Danny Gardela, an
November 1915, resulting in the dissolution of the FL after only two seasons of
play. See id.
36. See Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball Economics and Antitrust Immunity, 4 SETON
HAIL J. SPORTS L. 287, 288 (1994).
37. See id. Many at the time felt that $50,000 was more than reasonable for a
club located in a town described as unsuitable for major league teams and barely
passable for a minor league team. See id.
38. See Dr. Richard L. Irwin, A Historical Review of Litigation in Baseball, 1 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 283, 291 (1991).
39. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
40. See id.
41. See id. at 208-09.
42. Id. at 208-09.
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outfielder with the New York Giants, left the Giants for a team in
the Mexico League in 1946.4 3 Upon his return to America, Gar-
della found that MLB had blacklisted him; no team would allow
him to play.4 4 He brought an antitrust suit against MLB in federal
court.4 5 The district court dismissed Gardella's suit on the grounds
that Federal Baseball prohibited such actions. 46 However, on appeal,
the Second Circuit held that the dismissal was improper. Judge
Learned Hand noted that the environment had changed somewhat
since 1922, and that baseball's involvement with radio and televi-
sion broadcasting provided an appropriate basis for finding that it
was part of interstate commerce. 47 Gardella's case was ultimately
settled for $60,000 to avoid further judicial consideration of Federal
Baseball 48
Two years later, another player, George Toolson, attacked the
antitrust exemption. Toolson had refused to accept an assignment
from one New York Yankees' farm club to another, and as a result
had been placed on the club's ineligible list. As in Gardella, the
district court dismissed the complaint as impermissible under Fed-
eral Baseball 49 After the Ninth Circuit affirmed, in something of an
upset, the Supreme Court (by a seven-to-two vote) reaffirmed the
rule of Federal Baseball in a one-paragraph opinion.50 Congressional
43. See Gary D. Hailey & Douglas R. Pappas, Baseball and the Law, in TOTAL
BASEBALL 601 (John Thorn & Pete Palmer eds., 1994). The Mexico League, estab-
lished that year, lured several MLB players across the border for higher pay. Those
who left returned shortly thereafter, finding life in Mexico less pleasant than they
had expected. See MARviN MILLER, A WHOLE DIuFERENT BALL GAME: Ti- SPORT
AND BusrnEss OF BASEBALL 176 (1991).
44. See Halley & Pappas, supra note 43, at 601. Gardella did not return to
MLB, instead he found work as a hospital orderly. See id.
45. See Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
46. See id.
47. See Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1949).
48. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 11. This was a very large settlement, espe-
cially when one considers that Gardella was by no means a spectacular player. See
id. The top of the pay scale two years before the settlement was $100,000; in 1951,
the average player salary was $13,000. See id.
49. See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
50. See id. The entire text of the opinion reads as follows:
In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), this Court held that the business of providing
public baseball games for profit between clubs of professional baseball
players was not within the scope of the federal antitrust laws. Congress
has had the ruling under consideration but has not seen fit to bring such
business under these laws by legislation having prospective effect. The
business has thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the understand-
ing that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation. The present
cases ask us to overrule the prior decision and, with retrospective effect,
hold the legislation applicable. We think that if there are evils in this
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inaction in the wake of Federal Baseball was deemed to be conclusive
as to Congress' intent that MLB not be governed by antitrust law.51
The most recent Supreme Court examination of baseball's an-
titrust exemption came nearly 20 years later, in Flood v. Kuhn.52
Curt Flood, a star outfielder who had spent twelve years of his major
league career with the Saint Louis Cardinals, refused to report
when the Cardinals traded him to the Philadelphia Phillies follow-
ing the 1969 season. 53 Flood petitioned MLB Commissioner Bowie
Kuhn for free agency but was denied.54 He then brought an action
in federal court, asserting that the reserve clause violated antitrust
laws and the Thirteenth Amendment, among other claims. Noting
that Congress had failed to act on more than 50 bills that had been
introduced in order to abrogate baseball's antitrust exemption, 55
the Court refused to overrule its settled position despite its recogni-
tion that baseball was indeed engaged in interstate commerce and
that the antitrust exemption was an anomaly and an aberration.56
Once again, the Court stated that the elimination of the antitrust
exemption was best left to Congress. 57
Since its creation in 1922, then, baseball's antitrust exemption
has proven to be remarkably resistant to challenge despite the sus-
pect reasoning behind its creation. A recent district court opinion
took at least a chink out of the exemption's protective armor,58
field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be
by legislation. Without re-examination of the underlying issues, the judg-
ments below are affirmed on the authority of Federal Baseball, supra, so far
as that decision determines that Congress had no intention of including
the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.
Toolson v. N.Y Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).
51. Organized Baseball: Report of the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of
the House Committee on the Judiciay, H.R. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1952).
The year before Toolson, the subcommittee on the use of monopoly power for the
House Judiciary Committee voted to take no action at that time, concluding that it
was "premature to enact general legislation for baseball" and that "[]egislation is
not necessary until the reasonableness of the reserve rule has been tested by the
courts." Id. Thus, while the courts deferred to Congress' supposed intent, Con-
gress awaited the courts' anaysis. See id.
52. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
53. See id. at 264-65.
54. See id. at 265.
55. See id. at 282 n.17. None of these bills made it out of committee. See
David Grabiner, Frequently Asked Questions About the Baseball Strike, at §B1 (last modi-
fied Nov. 7, 1996) <http://www.baseball.org/baseball/Faq/>.
56. See Food, 407 U.S. at 282.
57. See id. at 283.
58. See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993). In
1993, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that baseball's
antitrust exemption did not apply to teams' attempts to move from city to city. See
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and, as discussed later in this article, there have been heightened
efforts to overturn baseball's antitrust exemption in Congress in
connection with the labor unrest of the mid-1990s. Nevertheless,
the antitrust exemption served as an important weapon against
player attempts to break down the reserve system for more than
fifty years.
C. The Rise of the Player Association
Players' efforts to gain bargaining strength through the forma-
tion of a collective bargaining unit date back more than a century.
In 1885, John Montgomery Ward, a shortstop with the New York
Giants, formed the Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Players.59
The Brotherhood's goal was to fight the reserve clause and the
$2,500 salary cap imposed by owners. 60 After the failure of its Play-
ers League, the Brotherhood collapsed in 1891.61
Over the next five decades, two additional attempts at organi-
zation were made. First came the Players Fraternity, which enjoyed
some success as a result of the concurrent establishment of the Fed-
eral League in 1914.62 The additional league provided players with
leverage, and collectively they had a measure of power.63 Because
the Players Fraternity's fortunes were intertwined with those of the
Federal League, however, the union dissolved along with the Fed-
eral League in 1915.64
In 1946, Robert Murphy, a Boston attorney, made another at-
tempt at unionization.65 Murphy hoped his organization, the
American Baseball Guild, would give players the leverage they
needed to increase their salaries at a time when star players were
dying in poverty.6 6 Unfortunately, the decidedly anti-union envi-
ronment of the mid-1940s doomed Murphy's efforts.6 7
Finally, in 1954 the players voted to establish the Major League
Baseball Players Association (MLBPA). 68 The MLBPA's early days
59. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 5.
60. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 4, at 5.
61. See Baseball & the Law-Yesterday and Today, supra note 4, at 1166.
62. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 6; Baseball & the Law-Yesterday and Today,
supra note 4, at 1167.
63. See HELYAR, supra note 13, at 6. The competition created by the establish-
ment of the Federal League raised the average salary from $1,200 to $2,800 from
1914 to 1915. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 9.
64. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 8.
65. See Baseball & the Law-Yesterday and Today, supra note 4, at 1164 n.1.
66. See Ha.YAR, supra note 16, at 10.
67. See MILLER, supra note 43, at 6.
68. See McCormick, supra note 4, at 1151.
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were rocky: it suffered from a lack of strong central organization,
an immature sense of identity and few concrete objectives. 69 Many
of the MLBPA's early difficulties were the result of management -
it was originally run by Judge Robert Cannon, whose pro-owner
sympathies ran deep.70 Further aggravating the MLBPA's short-
comings was the fact that its management, for more than a decade,
was only available on a part-time basis. 71 Fortunately for the play-
ers, Cannon declined an offer of full-time control of the union in
1966.72
Instead, the players hired Marvin Miller, a negotiator for the
United Steelworkers Union. Within a year, the MLBPA, under
Miller's leadership, had settled upon a pension plan and virtually
doubled players' benefits. 73 After years of stagnation, the MLBPA
became so effective under Miller's stewardship that MLB was com-
pelled to form its own collective bargaining unit, the Player Rela-
tions Committee (PRC).74
In 1968, the MLBPA and the PRC settled on the first collective
bargaining agreement in professional sports called the Basic Agree-
ment.75 The Basic Agreement was unique in that it was the first
time players and owners negotiated items such as minimum sala-
ries, benefits, pension payments and the like. 7 6 Significantly, the
first Basic Agreement included a grievance process, which allowed
players to file complaints against owners who violated their contrac-
tual rights.77 The grievance process gave the players the ability to
enforce the rights for which they had fought at the bargaining
table. 78
69. See Michael J. Cozzillio, From the Land of Bondage: The Greening of Major
League Baseball Players and the Major League Baseball Players Association, 41 CAT-. U.L.
REv. 117, 118 n.1 (1991).
70. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 4, at 17. Cannon aspired to become the Com-
missioner of Baseball. See id.
71. See MILLER, supra note 43, at 7.
72. See id. Owners were so pleased with Cannon that they proposed to pay
part of their revenues into a fund to pay for Cannon's New York City office. See id.
73. See id. at 153-55.
74. See Pietrusza, supra note 9, at 589.
75. See MILLER, supra note 43, at 163-64.
76. See id. at 164.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 165. The establishment of the new grievance process, however,
was only a partial victory. Under the procedure, grievances were heard by MLB's
Commissioner, an obviously biased arbitrator. See Hopkins, supra note 17, at 307.
Grievances brought in the wake of this new procedure were generally limited to
non-economic contractual issues, such as the quality of lodging or carriage pro-
vided by teams for their players. See MLLER, supra note 43, at 164-65.
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The second Basic Agreement emerged two years later, in 1970.
While the new Basic Agreement involved increases in minimum sal-
aries and restricted salary cuts to twenty percent,79 the provision
which would have the most impact on player/owner relations was
one which established the right to binding impartial arbitration.8 0
This provision laid the foundation for today's player compensation
system.
In 1972, the third Basic Agreement was concluded after a thir-
teen day players' strike during spring training and the scheduled
start of the regular season.8' This was the first league-wide work
stoppage in baseball history.8 2 The 1972 Basic Agreement took the
grievance-arbitration process one step further, establishing the
mechanism which facilitated the loss of the reserve clause: players
were now permitted to arbitrate grievances.8 3
D. The Evisceration of the Reserve Clause
After the 1974 season, Andy Messersmith, a pitcher for the Los
Angeles Dodgers, and Dave McNally, a pitcher for the Montreal Ex-
pos, were dissatisfied with their clubs' respective contract offers. 84
Unable to reach agreement on terms, the two were "renewed" by
their clubs pursuant to the renewal clause in their 1974 contracts,
and they both played the 1975 season without ever signing new con-
tracts for that season.8 5 Following the conclusion of the 1975 sea-
son, Messersmith and McNally were in a position to test whether
the renewal clause governed a player's rights in perpetuity, as clubs
contended, or expired after one season, as the clause's plain lan-
guage seemed to indicate. 86
79. See Pietrusza, supra note 9, at 589.
80. See MILLER, supra note 43, at 97. The 1970 Basic Agreement also estab-
lished a player's right to representation in individual contract negotiations. See
HELYAR, supra note 16, at 89.
81. See Mihoces, supra note 5, at 1C.
82. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 111-22. In 1912, members of the Detroit
Tigers struck to protest Ty Cobb's suspension for fighting with a fan. See id. at 8.
Much later, most MLBPA members participated in a spring training boycott in
1969 during negotiations for an upgraded benefits package, the first organized
work stoppage in baseball history since the Tigers' action. See id at 94-96.
83. See Pietrusza, supra note 9, at 590. The owners also granted players
$500,000 in concessions at the end of the strike, a victory which was somewhat
mitigated by the aggregate $600,000 in lost wages suffered by the striking member-
ship. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 4, at 85.
84. See MILLER, supra note 43, at 114.
85. See id.
86. See id.
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The arbitration panel consisting of Marvin Miller, John
Gaherin (the PRC's director), and Peter Seitz, MLB's arbitrator,
heard Messersmith and McNally's challenge to the reserve system. 8 7
Free agency for major league baseball players was at stake for the
first time since the introduction of the reserve system.88 Because
Miller and Gaherin were split along obvious lines, the decision fell
to Seitz.s9
One month before Seitz released his scholarly decision, he
wrote a letter to Bowie Kuhn, the MLB Commissioner at the time,
warning him about the likely outcome of the arbitration. 90 Kuhn,
either because he did not understand the implications of the arbi-
tration or because he simply was foolhardy, ignored Seitz's warning.
On December 23, 1975, Seitz released the panel's decision that the
reserve clause allowed unilateral renewal for one season only, and
not, as the owners had believed for nearly a century, for successive
seasons beyond the first renewal.91 Consequently, Andy Messer-
smith and Dave McNally became free agents. 92
Seitz was fired within hours of the decision, and the owners
immediately appealed to the courts. 93 A federal district court
found no impropriety on Seitz's part and upheld the arbitration,
which survived an appeal to the federal appellate court.94 All that
remained of the reserve system was its shell, because it no longer
allowed owners to enslave players for their entire careers.
87. SeeJoe Nathan, Steeee-riiiike!: Players and Owners Have Been Down This Bumpy
Road Before, SPORTNG NEWS, Aug. 22, 1994, at 14.
88. See MI.LER, supra note 43, at 227-37. The decision to request arbitration
of the validity of the renewal clause is significant because it was the first time play-
ers attempted to fight such restrictions without specifically attacking the antitrust
exemption. See id. A year earlier, an arbitrator declared star Oakland A's pitcher
Catfish Hunter a free agent after determining that A's owner Charlie Finley had
violated a provision of his contract with Hunter. See id.
89. HELYAR, supra note 16, at 35-36. Ironically, Gaherin did not believe that
the owners' interpretation of the reserve clause as an endlessly repeating renewal
provision was accurate. See id. He reportedly told National League Counsel Lou
Carroll: "I've read it, and to me it means you can renew a player for one year, and
that's it." Id.
90. See Hopkins, supra note 17, at 308-09. Seitz suggested that owners submit
the issue to further collective bargaining. See id.
91. See Hailey & Pappas, supra note 43, at 605.
92. See Hopkins, supra note 17, at 309.
93. See id. Obviously, Seitz was fired by the dissatisfied owners. See id. It
should be noted, however, that since Seitz was selected by both the MLBPA and
MLB owners, either side could have fired him. See id.
94. See Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
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E. The 1976 Basic Agreement and Successors
The fourth Basic Agreement was negotiated in the wake of the
Messersmith/McNally arbitration, following a spring training lock-
out in 1976. 95 The destruction of the reserve clause gave players
negotiating leverage, and the owners were haunted by images of
runaway free agency. Owners apparently did not understand the
implications of free agency, and they were concerned that the
MLBPA would demand immediate free agency for all players.
Miller, however, was smarter than that. He understood a basic eco-
nomic theory: the smaller the supply of free agents, the greater the
demand for them, and thus the more clubs would be willing to pay
for them. Miller did not want wholesale free agency.96
The Basic Agreement established the basic three-tiered com-
pensation structure in use today. Players became free agents after
six seasons of major league service. 97 Those with less than six years'
experience but at least two years in the majors could submit their
contracts to salary arbitration, which had been in effect since
1974.98 Clubs had renewal rights for players not yet eligible for ar-
bitration, limited only by rules defining the minimum salary and
maximum salary reductions.99
Immediately following the establishment of free agency in
1976, baseball salaries skyrocketed: the average salary jumped from
$51,501 in 1975 to $76,066 in 1976, and on to $143,756 by 1980.100
Despite the owners' instinctive fear of free agency, their aggressive,
95. See Stephen L. Willis, A Critical Perspective of Baseball's Collusion Decisions, 1
SETON HALLJ. SPORTS L. 100, 118 (1991).
96. See MILLER, supra note 43, at 267.
97. See RAY YASSFR ET AL., SPORTS LAW 265-66 (1994).
98. See BASIC AGREEMENT OF 1990, supra note 16, art. VI(F) (current arbitration
rules). The two year threshold for initial arbitration eligibility was raised to three
years during negotiations for the 1985 Basic Agreement. See infra note 106 and
accompanying text. It was later reduced in the 1990 Basic Agreement to some
portion of those players with between two and three years of service time. See infra
note 136 and accompanying text. A player's major league service time is the total
number of days the player was on a club's active list or disabled list during the
championship season, with a maximum of 172 days earned per season. See BASIC
AGREEMENT OF 1990, supra note 16, art. XXI(A).
99. See BASIC AGREEMENT OF 1990, supra note 16, art. VI(F) (B) & (D).
100. See salary figures obtained from MLBPA (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Salary Figures]. To put this into perspective, from 1975 to 1976,
the average player salary jumped $24,565. The second largest single-year increase
in player salaries prior to 1976 came in 1968, when the average salaryjumped from
$24,909 to $29,303 - a difference of $4,394. See id.
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and sometimes ill-advised, signing of free agents was the principal
cause of the dramatic salary increases. 10 1
The next Basic Agreement, scheduled to take effect for the
1980 season, was only concluded after a midseason strike was nar-
rowly averted. 10 2 Nevertheless, a fifty day mid-season strike oc-
curred in 1981, resulting in 719 canceled games. 10 3 The 1980
agreement, which saw few substantive changes to the revolutionary
new player compensation system established in 1976, promoted the
escalation of major league salaries. In just six seasons, from 1980 to
1985, the average salary rose from $143,756 to $371,157, an in-
crease of 158%.104 Predictably, baseball's overlords were deter-
mined to stunt this tremendous growth.' 05
Baseball's labor talks in 1985 were no more free of acrimony
than any previous round. In terms of the player compensation sys-
tem, management's stated goals were to impose a salary cap, limit
the raises that could be awarded players in arbitration, and raise the
threshold of eligibility for arbitration from two to three years of ma-
jor league service. 10 6 In support of their oft-asserted contention
that player salaries had risen beyond the capacity of the sport's reve-
nues to maintain MLB's economic viability, the clubs agreed to dis-
close their financial records to the union. When Professor Roger
Noll, a Stanford University economist, analyzed the books on the
players' behalf, however, he concluded that MLB clubs collectively
had earned a profit of $25,000,000 in 1984, notwithstanding the
clubs' proclamations of a $41,000,000 loss. 10 7 After another season-
interrupting strike, this time for only two days, the parties agreed to
a deal that increased the threshold for salary arbitration eligibility
101. See Hopkins, supra note 17, at 319. In a rush to sign free agents, owners
often signed mediocre or aged players, just for the sake of signing free agents. See
id.
102. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 227-29.
103. See id. at 287.
104. See Salary Figures, supra note 100.
105. See Hopkins, supra note 17, at 319.
106. See HEAyiAR, supra note 16, at 325-29.
107. See id at 325-26. For a detailed look at Professor Noll's methodology, see
ZIMBA ST, supra note 4, at 64-67. The discrepancy is consistent with the observa-
tion of Peter Beeston, a Vice President with the Toronto Blue Jays, who stated:
"Anyone who quotes profits of a baseball club is missing the point. Under gener-
ally accepted accounting principles, I can turn a $4 million profit into a $2 million
loss, and I can get every national accounting firm to agree with me." Id. at 62.
Player skepticism of owners' professed unprofitability was an important theme dur-
ing the labor negotiations of the mid-1990s. For a discussion of this alleged un-
profitability, see infra note 168 and accompanying text.
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to three years of service but otherwise left substantially intact the
player compensation system.108
F. Collusion
Dissatisfied by the relatively minor inroads into player gains
won through negotiation, the owners decided to try other tactics in
order to halt the growth in player compensation. Immediately
upon ratification of the 1985 Basic Agreement, owners set about
undercutting its provisions via collusion.
After the 1965 season, Los Angeles Dodgers star pitchers Sandy
Koufax and Don Drysdale teamed up to attempt to increase their
salaries through quasi-collective bargaining. 0 9 This gambit so en-
raged owners that during negotiations for the first Basic Agreement
they insisted that an anti-collusion provision be inserted into the
agreement." 0 In its present form, that provision decrees in rele-
vant part that "[p]layers shall not act in concert with other Players
and Clubs shall not act in concert with other Clubs."' Ironically,
this provision proved instrumental in an entirely unintended
context.
Taking a page from baseball's early days, owners entered into a
"gentlemen's agreement" following the 1985 season to restrict free
agent movement. Cowed by constant pressure from new MLB
Commissioner Peter Ueberroth to act with "fiscal responsibility,"
the owners collectively refused to sign any free agents whose previ-
ous clubs were interested in retaining their services." 2 The exist-
108. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 329. This concession, while relatively insig-
nificant, marked the MLBPA's first concession of a previously negotiated substan-
tive right under the 1976 compensation system. See MILLER, supra note 43, at 335-
39 (explaining and criticizing compromises made in 1985).
109. See ZiMBALIST, supra note 4, at 18. Koufax and Drysdale, the two best
pitchers of MLB's 1965 season and integral elements in the Dodgers' two consecu-
tive World Series victories in 1964 and 1965, had been offered contracts substan-
tially below what they felt their performance merited. See id. Deciding that by
negotiating together they would have better success than each would individually,
the two hired an attorney to negotiate their new deals. See id. The pitchers refused
to attend spring training in 1966, and threatened to find work in engagements as
diverse as acting (Koufax had apparently been offered a movie deal) and playing
in Japanese exhibition games. See id. Ultimately, the dispute was settled, with
Koufax and Drysdale signing at significantly higher salaries than they had received
in 1965. See id. The settlement provided players with an early indication of the
power of collective bargaining. See id.
110. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 337.
111. See BAsic AGREEMENT OF 1990, supra note 16, art. XX(F)(1).
112. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 339-48.
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ence, nature and extent of the agreement did not remain a secret
for long.113
The owners made little effort to disguise their collusive behav-
ior; rather, they flaunted their unwillingness to compete with each
other for the services of free agents.114 A conspiracy to bypass me-
diocre free agents could have gone undetected, or at least un-
proven. However, when a player such as the 1984 American League
Most Valuable Player Kirk Gibson was unable to attract any interest
on the free agent market," 5 and a mega-star like the Chicago Cubs'
Andre Dawson was forced to sign for substantially less than he had
earned in the previous year, 116 suspicions quickly grew to near
certainties.
Shortly after the extent of the restrictions on free agent sign-
ings became clear in 1985, the Players Association filed a grievance
against the clubs claiming collusion ("Collusion I"). 1 1 7 After the
free agent crop available following the 1986 season was similarly
spurned, the MLBPA filed a second grievance, alleging that owners
had not altered their behavior and again had colluded to restrict
the free agent market ("Collusion 11).118 Following the 1987 sea-
son, club owners tried a different tactic, bidding for free agents but
using an "information bank" in which they shared information
about offers made to free agents." 9 The MLBPA challenged this
practice as well ("Collusion III").
The owners' concerted effort to lower player costs was certainly
effective: the average player salary for the 1987 season, $412,454,
actually represented a decline from the 1986 average of $412,520.120
The information bank in use following the 1987 season was almost
as effective, limiting the average salary increase in 1988 to about six
percent ($438,729).121
113. See id. at 343.
114. See Hopkins, supra note 17, at 316.
115. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 336.
116. See Willis, supra note 94, at 126. The Cubs eventually signed Dawson for
$500,000, as compared to the previous year, when Montreal paid him $1,270,000.
See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 344.
117. See Willis, supra note 95, at 120.
118. See id. at 124.
119. Arbitration Between Major League Baseball Players Association and The
26 Major League Baseball Clubs, Proposed Framework for the Evaluation of Individual
Claims, at 3 [hereinafter PROPOSED FRAMEwoRK]. MLB Commissioner Ueberroth
had vigorously encouraged this exchange. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 346-47.
Owners also developed a system of non-verbal clues that would indicate whether
other teams were free to negotiate with a player. See id.
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While providing temporary respite from the large annual in-
creases in player costs, collusion ultimately carried a very large price
tag. In Collusion I, the arbitrator rejected the owners' claims that
there could be no collusion without a formal agreement, and even-
tually held that the dramatic changes in the free agent market
could not have occurred without some form of agreement.12 2 In
Collusion II, the arbitrator found that the club's claims of the exist-
ence of a free agent market were untenable and that the owners
had again acted in concert to eliminate the free agent market.123
After the MLBPA's challenge to the information bank, Collusion
III, was also upheld, it was clear that the industry-wide effort to con-
trol labor costs through "fiscal restraint" was a complete failure.' 24
Determination of damages was a challenge since estimates of the
degree to which the free agent and even arbitration markets were
depressed by collusion were highly speculative.12 5 Ultimately, the
three cases were settled for $280,000,000, to be distributed to indi-
vidual players by the MLBPA. 126
Collusion proved costly in another way as well. The owners'
collusive behavior reinforced suspicions held by MLBPA veterans
that owners could not be trusted to abide by their agreements. For
younger players, who may have been only vaguely aware of the "bad
old days" prior to 1976, collusion was an education and an affirma-
tion of the need for vigilance.
G. The 1990 Basic Agreement
Following the end of collusion, player salaries surged to an ex-
tent never-before experienced by professional athletes. The 1989
average salary of $497,254 shot to $597,537 in 1990 and to $851,492
in 1991.127 Owners were alarmed by the rapid growth. These in-
creases, however, represented an appropriate correction after collu-
sion created a huge imbalance between MLB revenues and player
salaries. For example, in 1985, the last year prior to collusion,
MLB's total revenues were $717,813,000.128 While collusion held
salaries relatively flat for the next three seasons, revenues contin-
ued to climb, reaching $1,007,519,000 in 1988 and $1,241,059,000
122. See Willis, supra note 95, at 122.
123. See id. at 124-25.
124. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 332-47.
125. See PROPOSED FRsmMwoRK, supra note 119, at 3.
126. See id. at 4.
127. See Salary Figures, supra note 100.
128. See Ballpark Figures, USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 1991, at 13C (table).
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the following season. 129 Further, clubs were flush with national tel-
evision broadcast rights money; CBS agreed to pay $1,060,000,000
for the rights to televise baseball's 1990-1993 seasons, double the
previous network contract.13 0 Former salary standards fell
quickly.13 1
In this setting, the PRC and MLBPA sat down to discuss a new
Basic Agreement. As had become standard in the industry, an
agreement came only after a 32 day work stoppage, in this case a
spring training lockout in 1990.132 The major point of contention
in the negotiations was salary arbitration. 3 3 Players desired to re-
turn to the two year threshold for arbitration eligibility that had
been obtained prior to the 1985 Basic Agreement. 34 Owners, on
the other hand, wanted to eliminate the arbitration process en-
tirely, which they blamed for dramatic salary increases. They also
demanded a salary cap.'3 5
The lockout was ended and an agreement was reached only
through the intervention of MLB Commissioner Fay Vincent. 3 6
The owners agreed to set the threshold for salary arbitration back
below the three year level. 13 7 In addition, players received an in-
129. See id.
130. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 387.
131. The highest paid players in baseball in 1989 were pitchers Orel Her-
shiser (Los Angeles Dodgers) and Frank Viola (New York Mets), who earned
$2,600,000 per year. In the nine-week period from November 17, 1989, through
January 22, 1990, the mantle of "highest paid player" passed from the Kansas City
Royals' Bret Saberhagen ($2,966,667 per year) to the Minnesota Twins' Kirby
Puckett ($3,000,000) and the Oakland Athletic's Rickey Henderson ($3,000,000),
to the California Angels' Mark Langston ($3,250,000) and the Royals' Mark Davis
($3,250,000), to the Athletics' Dave Stewart ($3,550,000), and then to the San
Francisco Giants' Will Clark ($3,750,000). See Woes Could Jeopardize '93 Season, USA
TODAY, Mar. 4, 1992, at 3C. The Clark signing was particularly vexing to some
owners, because Clark was still two years away from reaching the six years of major
league service necessary for free agency when he signed. See id.
132. See Baseball's Short, but Stormy Labor History, USA TODAY, July 29, 1994, at
2C.
133. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 4, at 26.
134. See Hopkins, supra note 17, at 310 n.75. Players alleged that when the
threshold moved up to three years, owners would delay placing a player on the 40
man roster for a week or two to delay the players' achievement of the three-year
threshold. See id.
135. See Pietrusza, supra note 9, at 594.
136. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 414-24.
137. See BAsic AGREEMENT, supra note 16, art. VI (F)(1). Under the new
threshold, players became arbitration eligible if they were within the top 17 per-
cent in total service time of players with at least two but less than three years of
major league service. See id.; see Jeffrey S. Moorad, Negotiating for the Professional
Baseball Player, THE LAw OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, § 5.05 [4] [b] (Gary
Uberstine ed., 1994). These arbitration-eligible players with less than three years
of service are commonly called "super-two's." See id.
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crease in management's pension contributions from $39,000,000 to
$55,000,000, and the major league minimum salary was increased
from $68,000 to $100,000.138 The owners' victories included a
lower pension plan amount13 9 and a change in the rules concern-
ing collusion.1 40
II. THE PLAYER COMPENSATION SYSTEM
As noted above, the three-tiered player compensation system
has been in place, with few changes, since free agency emerged
twenty years ago.'41 Players with six years of major league service
are unrestricted free agents; they can offer their services to any
team. 142 Players with less than six but more than two-plus years143
of service may arbitrate their salaries, but will remain the sole prop-
erty of their club unless the club refuses to participate in arbitration
and permits the player to become a free agent.'" Finally, players
not yet eligible for arbitration are subject to the clubs' renewal
rights. ' 45
Although this structure is far more favorable to players than
the old reserve system that prevailed for the first three-quarters of
this century, owners retain a great degree of discretion over the size
and allocation of their payrolls. Obviously, owners are in complete
control of salaries for all players who fall into the third tier, as they
are not able to seek employment independently, nor are they eligi-
ble for salary arbitration. In 1995, while the average player salary
138. See BASIC AGREEMENT OF 1990, supra note 16, art. VI(B).
139. See Pietrusza, supra note 9, at 594. Players had demanded $80,000,000.
See id.
140. See id. More than acting similarly is now necessary to show collusion;
teams must actively agree to collude. See id.
141. See YASSER ET AL., supra note 97, at 265. For the first decade after free
agency emerged, owners selected the right to negotiate with free agents through a
re-entry draft. This practice was abolished in 1985. See id.
142. See BASic AGREEMENT OF 1990, supra note 16, art. XX(B) (4). Provided, of
course, that they are not under contract with a team at the time. See id. There are
some limitations upon the frequency with which a player may exercise such rights
(repeater rights), and draft choice compensation may be required of clubs signing
free agents. See BASIc AGREEMENT OF 1990, supra note 16, art. XX(B)(4).
143. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
144. See BAsic AGREEMENT OF 1990, supra note 16, art. XX(A). This process,
called "non-tendering," essentially involves the club's intentional failure to comply
with the rule that requires a team to tender a new contract by December 20 to a
player in order to retain exclusive rights to the player under the reserve system. See
id. While free agency generally is desired by in-demand players, non-tendered
players are usually non-starters who find a crowded and inhospitable market. See
id.
145. See id. This renewal right is set forth in paragraph lOa of the Uniform
Player Contract. See id&
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was $1,110,766, the average for those players not yet eligible for
salary arbitration was $170,778, only $61,778 more than the major
league minimum salary. 146 As exactly one-half of the major league
players surveyed (412 out of 824 total players) fell into this group-
ing, the average club has near-total discretion over the salaries paid
roughly half the players on its roster.147 Under current rules, play-
ers must participate in at least three major league seasons before
arbitration becomes an option, giving clubs a reasonable period
during which they can obtain a player's services very cheaply.1 48
The arbitration process forces clubs to pay players a market
price that is determined by similarly situated players on other
clubs. 149 Arbitration hearings are relatively rare, as most filed cases
settle prior to hearing. 150 Nevertheless, even players who compro-
mise prior to hearing or who actually lose their arbitration cases
tend to receive substantial raises. 151
Increasingly, clubs have elected to avoid the arbitration pro-
cess, either by signing younger players to long term contracts that
preempt arbitration or by non-tendering players.1 52 In the off-sea-
son prior to 1995, of the 194 players with at least three but less than
six years of major league' service, only seventy actually filed for arbi-
tration, of which only nine proceeded to hearing.1 53 Of the 210
players entering 1995 with adequate service time for arbitration eli-
146. See Salary Figures, supra note 100.
147. See id. The survey includes all players included on a club's active roster
or disabled list as of August 31, the day before clubs' active rosters are expanded to
40 in order to allow minor league players to gain some major league experience.
See id.
148. A player who makes his major league debut on Opening Day of 1997 and
never plays another day in the minor leagues will have major league service time of
exactly one year at the end of 1997, exactly two years at the end of 1998, and
exactly three years at the end of 1999, assuming that each of these seasons is played
to completion. Thus, his first opportunity to use the arbitration process will be
prior to the 2000 season, after he has already played three major league seasons.
Even a super-two player, see supra note 137, will have played at least significant
portions of three major league seasons in order to gamer sufficient service time to
qualify.
149. See BASIC AGPREiEmENT oF 1990, supra note 16, art. VI (F). The niceties of
the arbitration process are described in the Basic Agreement.
150. See Moorad, supra note 137, § 5.05[4] [d], at 5-20.
151. See Salary Figures, supra note 100. 222 of 398 cases since 1974 resulted in
decisions for the club. See id.
152. See Moorad, supra note 137, § 5.05[4] [d], at 5-20. For a description of
non-tendering," see supra note 144 and accompanying text. The threat of a non-
tender will sometimes motivate a fringe player to sign a new contract with the club
and thereby forego the opportunity to arbitrate should the club have elected to
tender the player after all. See Moorad, supra note 137, § 5.05[4] [d], at 5-20.
153. See Salary Figures, supra note 100.
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gibility (including super-two's), whether they were actually afforded
the opportunity to file for arbitration, the average salary for that
season of $1,580,044 was considerably higher than even the average
for all players ($1,110,766).154
The third group of players, the free agents with at least six
years of service, are the most highly compensated. In 1995, the 202
players in this category earned an average of $2,542,186.155 Be-
cause pure market forces drive the contracts signed by players in
this grouping, there can be no argument but that the owners are
ultimately in control of the salaries paid to this group.
The three-tiered approach to player compensation under the
Basic Agreements leaves MLB ownership in virtually complete con-
trol of player salaries for the bulk of the players on the roster. Of
824 major league players in 1995, only seventy-six filed for arbitra-
tion and only ten had their salaries set by an arbitrator. The rest
signed as free agents, re-signed with clubs who already held their
rights, were bound to multi-year deals signed in 1994 or earlier, or
were renewed by their clubs pursuant to paragraph 10a of their
1994 contracts. 156
III. THE FAILURE OF THE OWNERS' COuNTER-REvoLUTION
The foregoing history should illuminate two recurrent themes
in labor-management relations in baseball. First, it should be clear
that owners have resisted player attempts at emancipation at every
turn. Second, it should be clear that owners have acted in what may
be uncharitably termed "bad faith" in their attempts to regain what
they perceive to be lost ground. While owners were able to forestall
efforts at player advancement from the beginning of professional
baseball well up to the mid-1970s, the revolutionary system estab-
lished in 1976 has survived all serious challenges.
Following the conclusion of the most recent Basic Agreement
in 1990, owners launched the most ambitious strategy yet for re-
asserting control over player salaries and freedom. This counter-
revolution has left the game in shambles, economically and reputa-
tionally, while thus far failing to achieve anything close to the
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A. Preparations for War
The end of collusion, the agreement upon a new collective bar-
gaining contract in 1990 which preserved (in fact, from the players'
perspective, improved) the previous player compensation system,
and the adjustment of the market for player salaries in the post-
collusion years undeniably resulted in a reduction of club profit-
ability. This reduction in the owners' share of the ever-burgeoning
revenue pot proved problematic for some clubs, because MLB reve-
nues are distributed among the member clubs in a famously inequi-
table fashion. 15 7 While more extensive revenue sharing among the
clubs clearly could have abated whatever financial difficulties some
teams encountered, the prevailing view among baseball owners
(particularly those with the greatest revenue streams) was that any
redistribution of funds to the poorer clubs should come from play-
ers first and from richer clubs second, if at all.
The first step in management's plan for an overthrow of the
player compensation system was the ouster of Commissioner Vin-
cent. Vincent, less than a year into his term as Commissioner, had
stepped into the 1990 spring training lockout and pressured owners
to abandon their efforts to eliminate arbitration and impose a sal-
ary cap. 158 In response to this pressure, the owners, in an attempt
to prevent Vincent from participating in future labor talks, tried to
strip him of his power to act. 159 The owners also hired Richard
Ravitch to conduct the next round of labor negotiations. 160 After
Vincent refused to permit the diminution of his powers, which he
felt he had exercised in "the best interests of baseball," 161 he was
forced to resign. 162 His replacement, Milwaukee Brewers' owner
Allan H. "Bud" Selig, was unlikely to provide a similar threat to any
hard line stance adopted by management. 63
157. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 4, at 69-73. Local broadcast fees and gate re-
ceipts are two significant revenue sources that are not shared equally amongst the
clubs. See id. at 48-50, 57. "Top-team to bottom-team ratios in either franchise
values or revenues exceed three to one." Id. at 69.
158. See supra note 136-140 and accompanying text.
159. See HELYAR, supra note 16, at 506-09.
160. See id. at 471. In an obvious slap at Vincent, Ravitch was hired at a higher
salary ($750,000) than the MLB Commissioner earned ($650,000). See id
161. MAJOR LEAGUE AGREEMENT, art. I, §§ 2-4 (effective Jan. 1, 1975).
162. The threat of Vincent's interference in labor matters was a significant, if
not crucial, element in his ouster. See Pietrusza, supra note 9, at 595. However the
owners had other complaints about their Commissioner as well. See, e.g., HELYAR,
supra note 16, at 493-517; ZIMBALIsT, supra note 4, at 45.
163. Although designated MLB's "Acting" Commissioner, Selig retained that
office some four years after Vincent's resignation.
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The Basic Agreement of 1990 was set to expire on December
31, 1993.164 Article XXIII(B), however, provided that either the
PRC or the MLBPA could reopen the agreement at the close of the
1992 season to reconsider the minimum salary, salary arbitration or
the reserve system.165 On December 7, 1992, owners, attempting to
recalibrate team profits and players' salaries, voted to reopen the
agreement. 166
B. "Negotiations"
The reopening of the Basic Agreement in 1992, which was
MLB ownership's rather dramatic statement of discontent with the
status quo, turned out to be entirely symbolic. There were no nego-
tiations of any kind between labor and management from the re-
opening to the natural expiration of the Basic Agreement at the
end of calendar year 1993.167 In late 1993, after failing to reach an
agreement among themselves on revenue sharing, owners prom-
ised not to lock out players during spring training in exchange for
players' promise not to strike.' 68 Thus, the 1994 season began in
April without a new Basic Agreement. 169
On June 14, 1994, claiming that nineteen of the twenty-eight
MLB teams were losing money and declaring an immediate need to
remedy this condition, 170 the owners offered their first proposal. 1 7 1
The proposal called for an equal split in revenues between players
and owners, a salary cap, the elimination of salary arbitration, the
164. See BASic AGREEMENT OF 1990, supra note 16, art. XXIII(A).
165. See id. art. XXIII(B).
166. See Strike Chronology, supra note 8. The vote was 15-13 in favor of reopen-
ing the agreement. See id.
167. See id.
168. See Pietrusza, supra note 9, at 597.
169. During this period, the parties were bound by the key terms of the 1990
Basic Agreement. By law, parties to an expired labor contract are required to
honor its mandatory provisions during the interim between agreements.
Mandatory provisions are those which concern wages, hours, and other terms or
conditions of employment. Courts in recent years have applied this definition lib-
erally. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Players Relations Comm., 880 F.
Supp. 246, 253 (1995).
170. See Grabiner, supra note 55, at C6. One of the most dependable ele-
ments of baseball is owners' claims of poverty. As noted previously, owners have
been warning the public of impending bankruptcy since 1881. In 1994, the esti-
mated number of teams losing money peaked at 22. This figure was later reduced
to 12. See id.
171. See Richard Keil, Selig Calls for Baseball to Find a Way to Settle Labor Dispute,
PORTLAND OREGoNIAN, July 14, 1994, at D4. The owners' first proposal, then, was
made over 18 months after reopening in 1992. See Phil Rogers, On the Labor Front:
Baseball Players Reject Proposal for Salary Cap, DALLAS MORNING NEws, July 19, 1994, at
Dl.
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lowering of the free agent threshold to four years and a raise of the
minimum salary.' 72
It is fair to say that this proposal was hardly calculated to lead
to a quick agreement. The MLBPA rejected the owners' proposal
and countered on July 18. The players' counter-proposal included
the elimination of repeater rights for veteran free agents, 173 a re-
duction in the salary arbitration threshold to two years, a raise in
the minimum salary to between $175,000 and $200,000, and an in-
crease in pension payments to players who played before 1970.174
The PRC quickly rejected the counter-proposal. 175
Ten days after making their proposal, 176 players set a strike
deadline for August 12, 1994.177 On August 1, owners failed to pay
$7.8 million into the players' pension and benefit funds, as re-
quired by the Basic Agreement. 178 Unable to bridge the distance
between their positions and angered by owners' failure to make the
mandatory payment, players struck as planned on August 12.179
172. See Rogers, supra note 161.
173. The Basic Agreement of 1990 provided, in pertinent part: "Any player
who becomes a free agent ... shall not subsequently be eligible to exercise his
right to become a free agent until he has completed an additional 5 years of Major
League Service." BAsIc AGREEMENT, supra note 13, art. XX(D) (1).
174. See Rogers, supra note 171.
175. See Pietrusza, supra note 9, at 598.
176. See Strike Chronology, supra note 8.
177. See Ross Newhan, Baseball Season Might End Today/Labor: Angered By the
Owners' Latest Maneuver, Players' Representatives Will Vote and Could Call For an Immedi-
ate Strike, LA. TimEs, Aug. 4, 1994, at 1. It has been suggested that players could
have hurt clubs more seriously by waiting until September 30 to strike, at which
point players would have received virtually their entire compensation for the sea-
son while threatening owners' television and attendance revenues from post-sea-
son play. See id. The much-earlier August 12 deadline was chosen because by that
point players had received two-thirds of their total compensation for the season,
the date threatened lucrative Labor Day weekend games, and there remained
more time to secure an agreement and preserve the post-season. See id.
178. See Ross Newhan, Baseball Owners Pull Plug on Talks/Labor: Their Executive
Council Implements Payroll Limits and Gets Rid of Arbitration. Players Will Appeal to
NLRB, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1994, at 1. The failure to make this payment
prompted the first of several complaints filed with the NLRB against owners. See
id. The NLRB issued a complaint against owners on December 14, 1994. See
Chuck Johnson, Owners, Players Hear Same Ruling in Different Ways, USA TODAY, Mar.
15, 1995, at 7C. Owners may have failed to make these payments in an effort to
provoke an immediate strike, which would have advanced three aims: (1) ensur-
ing that the strike was over prior to the playoffs; (2) ensuring that the players did
not elect to ignore their own strike deadline and target September 30 for a walk-
out, see supra note 177 and accompanying text; and, (3) obtaining a public rela-
tions edge over the players by portraying them as overreactive and too eager to
strike. See Newhan, supra note 177, at 1.
179. SeeJay Weiner, Major League Standoffs: What's the Business with Sports Labor
Strife, STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 6, 1994, at 1A.
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In the month following the beginning of the strike, manage-
ment and union representatives met sporadically. 180 Initial meet-
ings ended in failure; neither the players nor the owners were
willing to grant each other even minor concessions. 1 1 On Septem-
ber 8, however, players submitted a new proposal to owners that
would establish a payroll tax and a revenue sharing plan. 18 2 Own-
ers rejected this proposal, calling it "unresponsive." 83 On Septem-
ber 14, after little movement by either side, Commissioner Selig
announced the cancellation of the 1994 season. 184
C. The 1994-1995 Nuclear Winter and Thereafter
As negotiations broke down in mid-September, MLBPA Execu-
tive Director Donald Fehr focused his efforts on gaining Congres-
sional assistance in eliminating baseball's antitrust exemption. 85
The proposed bill easily passed a House subcommittee, as well as
the House Committee on the Judiciary.' 86 Unfortunately for the
players, Congress was set to adjourn six days after the bill passed
through the committee. 18 7 A decision was made to postpone the
vote until after Congress resumed in January of 1995.188
One month after the owners canceled the 1994 season, Presi-
dent Bill Clinton appointed William J. Usery to mediate the dis-
pute.18 9 Usery was President Ford's Secretary of Labor after
180. See Strike Chronology, supra note 8.
181. See id.
182. See Phil Rogers, Players Plan Labor War's Next Stage/Fehr Says Attack to Move
Against Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, Dallas Morning News, Sept. 11, 1994, at 15B.
The inclusion of a revenue sharing plan in the players' proposal was a significant
compromise. See id. Revenue sharing is thought to reduce the likelihood of the
shared funds being spent on player salaries, because poorer teams are more likely
to use shared funds to counter losses or retire debts rather than to increase payroll.
See id. Nevertheless, in the interest of both making a deal and in improving the
sport, the MLBPA designed and proposed a revenue sharing plan that met the
PRC's initial figures. See id. Players' efforts to design a mutually satisfactory plan
were continually frustrated by owners' arbitrary changes to their professed target
figures for redistribution. See id.
183. Mark Maske, Players Union Offers to Form Partnership; Licensing Fees Would
Aid Development, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1994, at C2.
184. See Pietrusza, supra note 9, at 599.
185. See Players Gain Ground/Baseball Labor Bill Approved for Vote, Amiz. REPuB-
mc, Sept. 29, 1994, at D4.
186. See id. Only one congressman opposed the bill. See id.
187. See Ross Newhan, Congress Won't Act on Baseball Exemption/Labor: Legisla-
tors Say They Will Take up Antitrust Again If Dispute Hasn't Been Settled By Januay, L.A.
TimEs, Oct. 1, 1994, at 2.
188. See id.
189. See Mediator Sets Ground Rules with Players, Owners/Baseball: He Uses the La-
bor Negotiating Session to Get Acquainted with Both Sides of the Dispute, ORANGE COUNTry
REG., Oct. 20, 1994, at D3.
[Vol. 4: p. 53
26
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol4/iss1/4
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL'S LABOR TuRMOIL
directing the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in the
early 1970s. 19 0 Despite optimism on both sides that Usery would
help the parties reach an agreement, formal negotiations did not
begin until November 10.191
On November 17, 1994, owners submitted their first new pro-
posal since June. 192 The proposal called for a luxury tax that would
be applied to payrolls over $35,600,000,193 which owners acknowl-
edged was designed to limit salary growth. 19 4 The tax was gradu-
ated, with rates increasing with increases in payroll. 195 The
maximum rate was seventy-seven percent. 196
On November 30, owners set a negotiation deadline for De-
cember 7, the last day that they could make salary arbitration offers
to players under the terms of the expired (but still operative) 1990
Basic Agreement. 19 7 The same day, after the players failed to sub-
mit a counter-proposal to the owners' November 17 tax plan, the
owners threatened to play the 1995 season with replacement
players. 198
On December 9, the MLBPA proposed a partnership between
players and owners under which the two parties would become in-
volved in cooperative revenue generating ventures. 199 The propo-
sal also brought the union's September salary tax proposal closer to
the owners' November proposal.2° ° Owners quickly responded with
two counter-proposals of their own: the first was the salary cap they
claimed they would implement if players refused to accede to own-
ers' demands, while the second was a partnership-and-tax plan that
included some elements of the players' most recent proposal. 20 '
190. See Larry Whiteside & Michael Kranish, Ex-Labor Chief Seen MediatingBase-
ball/Naming of Usery Expected Today, BOSTON GLOBE, OcL 14, 1994, at 1.
191. See Baseball Labor Talks Begin Again, BAL-moRE EvENING SuN, Nov. 10,
1994, at 4C.
192. See Strike Chronology, supra note 8.
193. See Hal Bodley, Players Take Time-out to Study Plan, USA TODAY, Nov. 21,
1994, at 2C. If players had received their full-year's compensation in 1994, 19 of
the 28 teams were over this threshold, some by as much as $19,000,000 or more.
See id.
194. See Ross Newhan, Baseball Labor Players Wll Study Payroll Tax Plan, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1994, at 19.
195. See Strike Chronology, supra note 8.
196. See id.
197. See Sports Labor Update: Baseball/Threat to Use Replacements, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 30, 1994, at D2.
198. See id.
199. See Maske, supra note 183.
200. See id.
201. See Mark Maske, Labor Department Certifies Baseball Strike, WASH. POST, Dec.
12, 1994, at C1. The partnership-and-tax proposal was two pages long, while the
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Players refused to accept the tax elements of the owners' pro-
posal, and talks broke down completely on December 14.202 On
December 23, the owners declared an impasse and unilaterally im-
plemented their salary cap provisions, including the elimination of
salary arbitration and anti-collusion provisions from the expired Ba-
sic Agreement.203
A declaration of "impasse" is a tool that allows management to
implement unilaterally its last good faith offer if negotiations reach
a stalemate. The policy behind impasse is to encourage movement
in labor negotiations. 20 4 Under the circumstances, the MLBPA did
not believe that their negotiations had reached the point of im-
passe; they had in fact made serious efforts to reach an agreement
that satisfied both parties. Consequently, the MLBPA immediately
filed an unfair labor practices claim with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) and instituted a signing freeze, under which
players were prohibited from signing individual contracts with
clubs.2 05
Negotiations resumed in late January, after President Clinton
set a settlement deadline for February 6, 1995.206 Both sides feared
that failure to resolve their differences before the deadline would
mean losing control over the resulting settlement for two reasons.
First, President Clinton had asked Usery to structure his own settle-
ment agreement if the dispute was not resolved before February 6.
Second, previous labor disputes had been brought to an end
through legislation proposed by the President.20 7
On February 3, owners revoked the salary cap plan they had
unilaterally implemented in December, fearing an imminent NLRB
complaint.20 8 However, after revoking the salary cap, Selig insti-
salary cap proposal was one-hundred pages. See Memorandum from Donald Fehr
to All Players 1 (November 22, 1994) (on file with author). The fact that two pro-
posals were produced is significant - it suggests that owners did not want the
union to accept the partnership-and-tax proposal.
202. See Strike Chronology, supra note 8; Richard Blum, Late-Night Talks Seem
Fruitless/Baseball: The Two Sides in the Protracted Labor Negotiations Continue to Work
With the Threat of A Salary Cap Looming, ORANGE CouN-rv REG., Dec. 14, 1994, at DI.
203. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Players Comm., 67 F.3d 1054,
1058 (2d Cir. 1995).
204. See id. at 1059.
205. See id.
206. See Ross Newhan, Baseball Tries it Again/Labor: Sides to Meet Wednesday, Fac-
ing Feb. 6 Deadline Set By President Clinton and Wary of An Imposed Settlement, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, at 1.
207. See id. In 1992, President George Bush asked Congress to end a nation-
wide railroad strike; Congress complied within 24 hours. See id.
208. See Tracy Ringolsby, Owners Agree to Scrap System with Salary Cap/Union
Proposal Expected Today, Roclw MTN. NEws, Feb. 4, 1995, at lB.
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tuted a signing freeze, barring teams from negotiating individually
with players.20 9 The players immediately filed another unfair labor
practices charge with the NLRB. 210
President Clinton's February 6 deadline passed without an
agreement, leaving the President "exasperated. 211 The President
ordered negotiators to attend a meeting in the White House the
next day, in which Labor Secretary Robert Reich, Vice President Al
Gore, Usery, and the President would take part.2 12 Usery presented
his proposal for settlement to the parties, but neither side accepted
his suggestions. Additionally, the President asked the parties to
submit to binding arbitration. The players agreed, but the owners
did not.2 1 3 Spring training began on February 16, with "replace-
ment players," who were minor leaguers and some renegade ex-ma-
jor league players, filling out the rosters.2 14
On March 15, the NLRB issued a complaint against owners for
unfair labor practices stemming from their failure to return to the
pre-existing system of salary arbitration and free agency when they
revoked their implemented salary cap plan on February 3.215 Two
weeks later, on March 27, the NLRB voted 3-2 to seek an injunction
against owners, which was filed later that day in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.2 16 That same
209. See President Strikes Out at White House/Labor: Clinton "Exasperated" That He
Can't Get a Settlement in Baseball Strike; Mediator Gets Nowhere, LA. Times, Feb. 8,
1995, at 1. Selig's letter, which was sent from the owners to the players, read in
part:
until such time as the [PRC and MLBPA] ratify a new collective bargain-
ing agreement o r until further notice, individual Major League Clubs
shall have no authority to negotiate terms and conditions of employment
(or any element thereof) with the [MLBPA] or individual players or certi-
fied agents. The [MLBPA] is now on notice that individual [c]lubs are
not authorized to negotiate or execute individual player contracts with
bargaining unit players during the pendency of collective bargaining be-
tween the [PRC and the MLBPA].
Silverman v. Major League Baseball Players Relations Comm., 880 F. Supp. 246,
252 (1995).
210. See Labor Dispute Chronology/Baseball Owners Say Play Ball B~ATrMORE SUN,
Apr. 3, 1995, at 5C.
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. See Baseball's Labor Negotiations, ST. Louis POsT-DisPATCH, Apr. 2, 1995, at
8D.
214. SeeJerry Crasnick, Baseball's Labor Talks Begin Again, DENY. POST, Feb. 27,
1995, at Dl.
215. See Baseball's Labor Negotiations, supra note 213.
216. See Mark Maske, NLRB Requests Injunction; If Granted, Baseball Strike Could
End, W H. POST, Mar. 28, 1995, at Cl. The Players Association stated at the time
that if the injunction were granted, they would return to work immediately. See
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day, owners submitted a new proposal to the MLBPA calling for a
fifty percent luxury tax on all team salaries over $44,000,000.217
On March 31, U.S. District CourtJudge Sonia Sotomayor ruled
in favor of the NLRB. Under the National Labor Relations Act, if a
court determines that the NLRB had reasonable cause to issue an
unfair labor practices complaint, and that equitable relief is 'just
and proper" under the circumstances, then the injunction will be
granted.21 8 Judge Sotomayor ruled that these conditions had been
met. Her decision was based on a finding that salary arbitration
and free agency were mandatory subjects of collective bargaining,
and that unilateral changes made to the free agency system by the
owners in the absence of an impasse amounted to a refusal to bar-
gain in good faith.219
This decision meant the end of the strike, as players had
pledged to return to work if the injunction were granted.220 Fulfil-
ling their promise, players offered to end the strike uncondition-
ally.2 2 1 The owners accepted the players offer, released the
"replacement players" that they had hired in February at the start of
spring training, and postponed the season's start until April 26.222
While this accord was taking place, the owners appealed the
District Court's ruling to the Second Circuit, seeking a stay of the
injunction.2 23 The three judge panel that heard the case, led by
Chief Judge Jon Newman, seemed unimpressed with the owners'
position at oral argument.224 Thus, it came as no surprise several
Alan Truex, Baseball Players Offer Deal/'94 Labor Conditions Sought in Injunction,
Hous. CHRON., Mar. 30, 1995, at 1.
217. Peter Schmuck, Baseball Owners Present New Bid to Settle Strike, BAL-smoRE
SUN, Mar. 28, 1995, at lA.
218. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Players Relations Comm., 880 F.
Supp. 246, 255 (1995).
219. See id. at 257.
220. See Hal Bodley, Now is Time for Compromise / Labor Ruling Throws Ball Back
to Players, Owners, USA TODAY, Mar. 15, 1995, at 7C.
221. See Ross Newhan, It's Now Official. Baseball to Return / Labor Ruling Throws
Ball Back to Players, USA TODAY, Mar. 15, 1995, at 7C.
222. See Labor Dispute Chronology/Baseball Owners Say Play Bal BALTimoRE SUN,
Apr. 3, 1995, at 5C.
223. See id.
224. See Judges Fire A No-Hitter at Owners, Com. Appeal (Memphis), Apr. 5, 1995,
at DI. At one point in his argument, PRC counsel Frank Casey claimed that the
injunction eliminated the players' incentive to negotiate. Judge Newman stopped
Casey and asked: "You really believe it?... Is that your position? ... [W] hat will it
take to persuade you that that position is wrong?" Dave Van Dyck, Appeals Judges
Mock, Reject Baseball Owners'Plea, Cm. SuN-TIMEs, Apr. 5, 1995, at 134. MLB's own-
ers fired Casey, who had been MLB's counsel for a decade, as a result of this humi-
lation. See Baseball Owners Hire New Attorney, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 27, 1995, at
10.
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months later when the Circuit Court upheld Judge Sotomayor's
decision.225
While the shortened 1995 season was played without interrup-
tion, an uneasy calm settled over the off-the-field conflict.226 A
handful of negotiating sessions in the 1995-1996 off-season ap-
peared to narrow the differences between the parties. The end of
the 1996 season was the first complete major league season played
since 1993. It appeared that a new Basic Agreement was on the
horizon; one which had increased minimum salaries, minor
changes to salary arbitration procedures but not eligibility, revenue
sharing among clubs, a payroll and/or luxury tax, regular season
interleague play, and credit to individual players for major league
service time lost due to the strike. 227
D. The Cost of the Strike
At this writing, the four-year old conflict between MLB owners
and players remains unresolved. It is appropriate to ask what the
cost of this conflict has been, and what has been gained.
As the 1996 season began, estimates placed the total cost of the
strike to both parties in the area of $1,000,000,000. Players were
reported to have lost $243,000,000 in wages due to canceled games,
while owners lost $376,000,000 in reduced attendance and televi-
sion revenues in 1994 and $326,000,000 in lost attendance in
1995.228 Almost incalculable are the lost opportunities for all in-
volved in the sport, including endorsement and other marketing
opportunities and ancillary revenue sources. Attendance in 1996
was noticeably below pre-strike levels 2 29 and television ratings were
positively anemic,230 raising the specter of lost revenue for years to
come. Fan cynicism and disillusionment must be at an all-time
high.
225. Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relation Comm., 67 F.3d 1054 (2d
Cir. 1995).
226. The 1995 season was shortened to 144 games to reflect the late-April
start.
227. See, e.g., Hal Bodley, Hard-hitting Delivery Marks Labor Update, USA TODAY,
Sept. 12, 1996, at 11C.
228. See Baseball Owners Taken Deep with $700 Million in Losses, S.F. EXAMINER,
Apr. 11, 1996, at Dl.
229. See BASEBALL A_ mcA's 1994 ALMANAC, 11 (Allan Simpson ed., 1994). In
1993, the last full season before the strike, 70,245,237 people attended MLB
games. See id. In 1996, that figure was 60,100,715. See USA TODAY BASEBALL
WEEKLY, Oct. 16-22, 1996, at 37.
230. See Michelle Smith, Baseball's TV Ratings Barely on the Rebound, OAKLAND
TRIBUNE, July 12, 1996, at D3.
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To the extent that the owners' destructive efforts to overthrow
the sport's player compensation system were truly motivated by a
straightforward desire to control costs, the irony is that the average
salary of MLB players has remained static for most of this decade
following the post-collusion market correction previously discussed.
In 1992, the average salary was $1,028,667.231 In 1993, after the
owners voted to reopen the Basic Agreement but before any sub-
stantive negotiations occurred, the average salary was $1,076,089,
less than five percent higher.23 2 In 1994, the first strike year, the
average salary (not adjusted for wages lost to the strike) was
$1,168,263, an increase of less than nine percent. Salaries the fol-
lowing year, in 1995, averaged $1,110,766, a five percent decline. 233
Thus, over a four-year period, the average salary of a major league
baseball player increased only eight percent from 1992 to 1995.
Even without the strike, the rapid salary growth of the post-collu-
sion years was finished.
Further, it has been clear from the start that any financial diffi-
culties that some franchises face could be eliminated or at least alle-
viated through more extensive revenue sharing. In a very real
sense, the root cause of many owners' dissatisfaction with their
clubs' bottom lines was not that too great a share of the industry's
revenues were flowing to the players, but that too great a share of
the industry's revenues were flowing to other owners. 234
It seems clear, then, that the owners' counter-revolution has
been a dismal failure. It was launched from the disingenuous
premise that the extant player compensation system was in need of
overhaul, or that the players could be forced to dismantle their
hard won gains. The counter-revolution was neither subtle in its
tactics - eviscerating the Office of the Commissioner, failing to
make contractually required benefits payments, declaring impasse
and imposing a new compensation system when bargaining clearly
remained available, misleading the NLRB concerning their intent
to reinstate the old rules, refusing to accept the President's offer of
binding mediation, foisting the replacement player debacle upon
231. See supra Salary Figures, supra note 100.
232. See Hal Bodley, Salaries Continue to Rise but So Do Revenues of Clubs, USA
TODAY, Aug. 17, 1994, at 3C. MLB revenues in 1993 were $1,879,737,000, an indus-
try record and an increase of 13% over the 1992 total. See id.
233. Interestingly, despite the strike, MLB clubs averaged a $2,100,000 net
profit in 1995. See Tushar Atre et al., Sports: The High Stakes Game of Team Owner-
ship/Owning a Pro Team Can Be More Lucrative Than Owning Stocks and Bonds. But It's
Becoming a Lot Riskier, FINANciAL WORLD, May 20, 1996, at 56.
234. See Leonard Koppett, Baseball Is Facing a Major Disaster, OAKLAND T~iu-
UNE, Nov. 11, 1996, at B10.
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the public - nor effective in attaining its goals. As it stands now,
salary arbitration and free agency will not be eliminated. There will
be no salary cap. When a new Basic Agreement is ratified, it seems
more than likely that business will continue as before.2 3 5
IV. THE FUTURE
Of the many features of major league baseball that set it apart
from other professional sports in America, one of its most troubling
is its lengthy history of virulent antagonism between labor and man-
agement. Buoyed by the fortuitous protection of the special anti-
trust exemption, baseball owners held their athlete employees in
virtual bondage throughout their professional careers. When nego-
tiations and litigation compelled changes in the way ownership has
run its industry over the past 20 years, all such changes, and indeed
even agreements to maintain the status quo, have come only after
continued acrimony and "hardball" measures.
In recent years, owners' twin desires to gain greater authority
over players' freedom and redistribute a greater portion of industry
revenues from players to clubs have, if anything, exacerbated the
historic tension between the two camps. Like the boy who cried
"wolf," owners have destroyed their own credibility when it comes
to assertions of heavy financial losses. Further, their naked efforts
to crush union loyalty, whether through the deprivation of benefits,
the retention of replacement players, the arbitrary refusal to negoti-
ate in good faith, and even the advancement of spurious legal posi-
tions have done little to suggest that baseball's ownership has
emerged from the feudal (and therefore futile) model of manage-
ment-labor relations.
Baseball players and owners have a mutual stake in the eco-
nomic health of the game. Clearly, the most economically advanta-
geous relationship for both sides would be one that permitted the
formation of a true partnership in the celebration and promotion
of baseball. Unfortunately, relations between the two sides have
been so poor that collective bargaining negotiations tend to take on
the character of a sporting contest themselves, with owners scoring
wins or losses depending upon the degree to which they can roll
back player rights or impede their exercise. When restoration of
hegemony is the primary goal for owners, there is no chance that
235. With one important exception: owners are likely to incorporate a real
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the sides can progress to the point of understanding and evaluating
each other's needs and interests in the negotiation setting.
The unfortunate consequence of the most recent conflict,
apart from short-term monetary losses and diminished fan support
or loyalty, is the perpetuation of the deep-seeded mistrust and hos-
tility between owners and players. Until ownership is willing to put
the good of the game over individual desire for authority and ever-
increasing shares of the revenues, there is no hope that a fully pro-
ductive and efficient bond can be formed with players.
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